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Japan's Constitution and U.N.
Obligations in the Persian Gulf
War: A Case for Non-Military
Participation in U.N.
Enforcement Actions
Introduction
Throughout its post-war history, Japan has walked a legal tightrope
between seemingly contradictory obligations imposed by its constitution
and the Charter of the United Nations. This tension came to a head in
1990 when Japan agonized over the question of sending military troops
to join U.N. forces in the Persian Gulf War. Despite an apparent conflict
between domestic and international law, the ultimate course taken by
Japan, contributing non-military assistance to the U.N. coalition,1 suc-
cessfully complied with legal obligations contained both in Japan's con-
stitution and in the U.N. Charter.
Japan's "Peace Constitution" of 1947 [Kenpif] appears to preclude
maintenance of military forces. Article 9 states in part: "[T]heJapanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes... land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained."' 2
1. Japan pledged $13 billion to the Gulf coalition, including $11 billion in sup-
port for multinational forces and $2 billion in economic assistance for countries
affected by the Gulf War. PR NEWSWIRE, Jan.24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File. In April 1991, two months after fighting in the region had
ended,Japan sent four minesweepers and two support ships to the Gulf to clear ship-
ping lanes. Sam Jameson, Japan to Send Ships to Gulf in Foreign Policy Reversal, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1991, at Al. Though important as the first overseas non-training
mission forJapan's military, this naval dispatch occurred during peacetime, outside a
U.N. framework, and had political and economic as opposed to military objectives.
Id. Thus, the constitutionality ofJapanese military participation in U.N. enforcement
activities remains unchanged. But see infra note 244.
2. KENP6 [Constitution] art. 9 (Japan) (emphasis added). The English version of
Japan's constitution cited herein is the official U.S. State Department version,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE CONsTrruTION OF JAPAN, Publication 2836, Far Eastern
Series 22 (1947). Prior drafts ofJapan's constitution cited infra are also official gov-
ernment translations.
Language differences complicate a strict textual analysis of a foreign constitution.
While officials concurrently drafted Japan's constitution in both English and Japa-
nese, making a textual analysis less problematic in this unique situation, difficulties
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This language served Japan well in the days of post-war reconstruction.
During this period, Japan felt neither a need nor a desire to engage in
war.
U.N. Charter obligations, which Japan agreed to fulfill 3 when it
became a U.N. Member in 1956,4 appear to require Japan to contribute
armed forces to international peacekeeping efforts. Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter, specifically in Article 43,5 requires that "[a]ll Members ...
undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in
accordance with special agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities
... for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." 6
When read in isolation from historical context and other relevant provi-
sions, these passages from Japan's constitution and the U.N. Charter
seem difficult, if not impossible, for Japan to reconcile.
Concern over this conflict of duties emerged in Japan's legislature,
the Diet, as early as the 1946 debates on the new constitution. 7 Some
members believed that Article 9 should be revised to allow full U.N. par-
remain. For a scholarly study of linguistic and cultural aspects of the drafting of
Japan's constitution, including the intentional use of language ambiguities to make
constitutional provisions acceptable to both sides, see KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR'S
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY IN ITS MAKING (1991).
3. Language in the Charter requires acceptance of U.N. Charter obligations as a
condition of Membership. U.N. CHARTER art. 4, 1.
4. Roster of the United Nations (As of 31 March 1956), 1956 U.N.Y.B. 489, U.N.
Sales No. 1957.1.9. The Security Council recommended Japan for Membership on
December 12, 1956. Admission of New Members, in id. at 109, 114. The General Assem-
bly unanimously voted to admit Japan on December 18, 1956. Id. at 110.
5. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, entitled "Action With Respect to Threats to
the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," authorizes sanctions and
describes methods of sanction enforcement. It includes Article 43. U.N. CHARTER
ch. VII.
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, I (emphasis added).
7. In 1946, the Imperial Diet consisted of a lower House of Representatives, and
an upper House of Peers. During World War II, the Diet became "an outright rub-
ber stamp for the executive" and participated minimally in wartime decisions. Justin
Williams, The National Diet, in I POLITICAL REORIENTATION OFJAPAN 145 (undated, but
1949) [hereinafter National Diet]. The new constitution later transformed the Diet
into the preeminent body of state power, but during the interim debates on the con-
stitution, the Diet was just beginning to emerge as an independent political force.
On April 10, 1946, the first post-war general election for the House of Representa-
tives was held, under occupational auspices. Id. at 147. This elected House of Rep-
resentatives participated in the constitutional debate.
The 1946 House of Peers was comprised of Imperial family Members, Imperial
nominees, and Members selected from amongJapan's highest taxpayers. Id. at 181.
Academics were added to this elite body specifically to participate in discussions
regarding the new constitution. JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, JAPAN
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 15 (1958) [hereinafterJAPAN AND THE U.N.]. This House of
Peers continued until March 31, 1947, National Diet, supra, at 18 1, and directly partici-
pated in ratifying the new constitution in the fall of 1946. See infra note 89 and
accompanying text.
Japan's current Diet retains a lower House of Representatives, but the upper house
is now called the House of Councillors. KENP6 art. 42. Both houses are now elected
from the general population, but the lower house is generally considered more pow-
erful. THEODORE MCNELLY, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT INJAPAN 141 (3rd ed. 1984).
For a discussion of the legislative transformation from Imperial Diet to the current
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ticipation.8 The official government position supported the firm renun-
ciation language of Article 9 despite its potential impact on Japan's
future role in the United Nations.9 Still others supported Article 9 with
the understanding expressed by Yoshinari Abe, chairman of the House
of Peers constitutional committee, that in light of Article 9 Japan would
have to be exempted from the U.N. duty to provide armed forces.10
Prior to 1990, debates about Japan's legal duties were largely aca-
demic. Since Japan's admission to the United Nations in 1956, a Cold
War-hampered Security Council had never united in acting under Chap-
ter VII to enforce sanctions. 1  That changed in August 1990 when Iraq
invaded Kuwait. In response to the Iraqi invasion, the U.N. Security
Council passed several resolutions condemning the invasion and author-
izing the use of force after January 15, 1991.12 A revitalized Japan had
to decide for the first time in its post-war history what role it would play
in a United Nations military enforcement action.
Japan addressed this issue under the pressure of heightened inter-
national expectations. Japan's economic strength and dependence upon
Persian Gulf oil seemed to suggest thatJapan ought to contribute to the
Gulf coalition in a meaningful way. The international community was
less interested in constitutional restraints than in direct Japanese
involvement in the region. Some commentators even suggested that
Japan lacked a constitutional basis for not participating militarily.' 3
This Note analyzes Japan's legal obligations to the U.N. in military
sanction enforcement. The analysis discusses the implications ofJapan's
unique constitution and uses the Persian Gulf War as an illustration.
Part I briefly describes the U.N. response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
and the pressure exerted upon Japan to contribute troops to the U.N.
coalition. Part II addresses the constitutionality of Japan's sending
troops abroad. As a starting point, Part II examines the origin ofJapan's
constitution, particularly Article 9, the provision specifically addressing
National Diet, see National Diet, supra, at 145-85; JUSTIN WILLIAMS, JAPAN'S POLMICAL
REVOLUTION UNDER MAcARTHUR 144-63 (1979).
8. Shigeru Nambara, President of Tokyo University, articulated this position.
Nambara was one of many scholars added to Japan's House of Peers to contribute to
the constitutional debate. JAPAN AND THE U.N., supra note 7, at 16. For a concise
.discussion of the legislative debate surrounding Article 9 and its effect on future U.N.
obligations, see id. at 14-18.
9. Id. at 16-17.
10. Id. at 18.
11. Samuel Pollack, Self Doubts on Approaching Forty: The United Nations' Oldest and
Only Collective Security Enforcement Army, The United Nations Command in Korea, 6 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 1, 9-10 (1987). INDAR RIKiun ET AL., THE THIN BLUE LINE, INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING AND ITS FUTURE 4 (1974). The Security Council's only prior invoca-
tion of Chapter VII sanctions occurred in 1950 during the Korean Conflict, six years
prior to Japan's joining the U.N. Pollack, supra, at 8-9. For a discussion of Korea, see
infra notes 205-15 and accompanying text.
12. E.g., S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990);
S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
13. See, e.g., Donald Hellmann,Japan's Bogus Constitutional Excuses in the Gulf, WALL
ST.J., Feb. 6, 1991, at A12.
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the question of Japanese military activities. Part II next explores
whether the original meaning of Article 9 has changed due to textual
amendment, judicial interpretation, executive interpretation, or legisla-
tive interpretation. Finally, Part II examines the Japanese government's
attempt to accommodate calls for Japanese troops in the war against
Iraq by changing the interpretation of Article 9. Part III analyzes the
obligations of Member States to enforce U.N. sanctions under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter. This analysis considers the Korean War, the
only prior U.N. sanction-enforcement effort. Part IV considers the ques-
tion of whetherJapan deserves to be a Member of the U.N. in light of its
constitutional restraints. The Note concludes that Japanese participa-
tion in military enforcement activities is inconsistent withJapan's consti-
tution. Further, Japan's non-military contributions to the anti-Iraq
coalition in the Persian Gulf War satisfied Japan's U.N. legal obligations
because Member States bear no legal duty under the Charter to contrib-
ute militarily to U.N. enforcement of sanctions.
I. The United Nation Coalition Against Iraq
A. Failure of the Economic Embargo
Iraq's August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait sparked an immediate and con-
certed response from the world community. The United Nations Secur-
ity Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, enacted a
world-wide economic embargo against import and export of oil and
other goods to and from Iraq and occupied Kuwait. 14 Military troops,
largely from the United States, but also from other U.N. Member States,
went to Saudi Arabia for the short-term purpose of protecting the
Saudis from the Iraqi threat and enforcing the economic embargo. 15
When six months of economic sanctions failed to drive the Iraqi
Army from occupied Kuwait, an increasingly impatient Security Council
turned to more drastic measures. U.N. Security Council Resolution 678
authorized military troops assembled in the Persian Gulf region to use
force if Iraq refused to pull out of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait's former
government byJanuary 15, 1991.16 Iraq refused; the Persian Gulf War
began a day later.
B. An Invitation for Japan
The United States took the lead in building a U.N. coalition to effect
Resolution 678 by soliciting military and financial support from U.N.
14. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).
15. Although troops were deployed to the region weeks earlier, the first U.N. call
for endorsement of the embargo against Iraq came on September 25 in Resolution
670. S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR 2943d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 (1990). Para-
graph 7 of Resolution 670 "[cjalls upon all states to co-operate in taking such meas-
ures as may be necessary, consistent with international law., to ensure the effective
implementation of the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) or the present resolu-
tion." Id. at 3.
16. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
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Members worldwide, including Japan.17 The exact nature of the Bush
Administration's request to Japan is unclear. Officially, the White
House denied asking Japan to send troops to the Persian Gulf, stating
that the question was an "internal matter" for the Japanese government
to decide.' 8 Japanese newspapers, however, reported that President
Bush telephoned Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu specifically
requesting the dispatch of Japanese troops to the Gulf.19 Furthermore,
Assistant Secretary of State Richard H. Solomon sent a clear message to
the Japanese government in testimony before the House Subcommittee
on Asian and Pacific Affairs: "What is needed is not only [Japanese]
financial support but personnel and transportation resources as well.
We have been heartened by recent comments by Japanese government
spokesmen that thousands ofJapanese personnel may yet go to the Gulf
in non-military roles." 20 During the following month, Japanese newspa-
pers quoted the U.S. State Department: "[The United States] would
welcome direct participation by Japanese personnel in a substantial and
visible role in support of the multi-national effort." 2 1 Based on these
reports, the United States did exert pressure on Japan to send military
troops to the region and forced Japan to confront the question of send-
ing troops abroad.
H. The Constitutionality of Japan's Sending Troops Abroad
The language of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution [Kenpi] seems
dispositive on the constitutional question of sending Japanese military
troops to foreign countries:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of
the nation and the threat or use offorce as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea,
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
22
17. See, e.g., R. C. Longworth, British Send 6,000 Troops to the Gulf, CHi. TRIB., Sept.
15, 1990, at 13 (military contributions); U.S. to Bill Allies on Gulf; Others Must Bear Share
of Billions in Costs, Bush Says, L.A. TMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at P1 (financial contributions).
18. Irene Kwaii, Japan's Kaifu Under Heated Attacks for Gulf Troop Plan, CENTRAL
NEws AGENCY, Oct. 18, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (quoting
statement by Roman Popadiuk, Deputy White House Press Secretary, in an October
18, 1990, press briefing). The language employed was somewhat ambiguous: "I
don't think anyone has specifically requested the government of Japan to dispatch
troops to the Persian Gulf." Id.
19. U.S. Has Not Asked Japan to Send Troops to Persian Gulf, REUTERS, Oct. 17, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. The Japanese newspapers quoted
senior Japanese government officials as the source for this story.
20. Kwaii, supra note 18.
21. David Butts,Japan Talks of Sending Volunteers to Gulf, UPI, Nov. 9, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
22. KENP6 art. 9 (emphasis added).
Cornell International Law Journal
Many factors influence the legal interpretation of provisions in Japan's
constitution. Before concluding that sending troops abroad violates
Article 9, these influencing factors must be addressed.
First, because Japan's constitution originated under the watchful
eye of victorious U.S. occupational forces, its legitimacy may be suspect.
Had the U.S. forced Japan to accept Article 9, formal revision or infor-
mal sidestepping of the provision would appearjustified. The history of
Article 9, however, strongly indicates both Japanese origin and popular
acceptance of the Article, despite the occupational circumstances. 2 3
Second, legislative history influences the meaning of Article 9. The
official government interpretation, upon which ratifying Diet members
relied, did not allow Japanese military troops to exist, let alone allow
their deployment abroad. 24
Third, Japan's constitutional provisions can be altered in a number
of ways. Formal textual amendments or informal interpretations by
Japan's judicial, executive, or legislative branches can change constitu-
tional meaning. 25 In the absence of these types of changes, however,
the original meaning of the constitutional language endures.
A. The Origin of Article 9
Upon Japan's unconditional surrender at the end of World War II, the
occupational forces, led by General Douglas MacArthur, set out to
reform and rebuild the conquered nation.26 U.S. reformers outlined
twin goals:
a. To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the
United States or to the peace and security of the world.
b. To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and
responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and
will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals
23. See infra notes 26-61 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
26. Of the many historical accounts concerning constitutional revision during the
Allied occupation ofJapan, the official government record is Alfred Hussey, The New
Constitution ofJapan, in GOVERNMENT SECTION OF GENERAL QUARTERS, SUPREME COM-
MANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, POLITICAL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN 82 (undated,
but 1949) [hereinafter Hussey]. This account is found in a two-volume record, Vol-
ume One [hereinafter I POLITICAL REORIENTATION] containing discussions of various
facets of the occupation with pages numbered 1-401. Volume Two [hereinafter 2
POLITICAL REORIENTATION] contains an exhaustive compilation of associated docu-
ments and is page numbered 402-1300.
For accounts by participants, see DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, REMINISCENCES 267-324
(1964); ALFRED OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIEDJAPAN 43-64 (1976); WILLIAMS,
supra note 7, at 98-143; and Charles Kades, The American Role in Revising Japan's Impe-
rial Constitution, 104 POL. ScI. Q. 215 (1989). Other accounts include Robert Ward,
The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 980 (1956); Theo-
dore McNelly, The Japanese Constitution, Child of the Cold War, 74 POL. SCI. Q 176
(1959); andJohn Maki, The Japanese Constitutional Style, in THE CONSTrrTTON OFJAPAN
3 (Dan F. Henderson ed., 1968).
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and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 27
Revision of Japan's Meiji Constitution28 was essential to meet these
goals. Further, MacArthur viewed revision of the Meiji Constitution as
necessary for Japan to meet the requirements of the Potsdam Declara-
tion.2 9 In addition to the Potsdam Declaration, two other directives
guided the process of constitutional revision; neither called for a Japa-
nese renunciation of war. The first directive was a policy paper on Japan
generated by the U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.3 0 In
the second directive, Secretary of State Byrnes communicated instruc-
tions directly to George Atcheson, the top State Department official in
Japan.3 1 Both official directives expressly contemplated a future military
force in Japan, after post-war demilitarization.3 2
Newly formed Japanese political parties also made public proposals
for constitutional revision. The Progressive, Liberal, Social Democrat,
and Communist Parties all made constitutional draft proposals in the
early days of the occupation.33 These political parties sought to attract
voters as well as to influence political debate through their respective
proposals. Like the official U.S. directives, each political party proposal
omitted demilitarization and the renunciation of war.3 4
Thus, the permanent demilitarization and war renunciation lan-
guage of Article 9 came neither from Washington directives nor from
internal Japanese political debate but from less official sources.
Prime Minister Shidehara responded to MacArthur's call for consti-
tutional reform by commissioning a constitutional review committee
chaired by Dr. Joji Matsumoto.3 5 The resulting Matsumoto Committee
27. United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, reprinted in 2 POLITICAL
REORIENTATION, supra note 26, at 423.
28. The Meiji Constitution, or "Constitution of the Empire of Japan," was
promulgated in February, 1889. SHIN'ICHi Fuju, THE CONSTITUTiON OF JAPAN 266
(1965). For a history of its development as Japan's first constitution, see id. The
Meiji Constitution contained express provisions outlining the supremacy of Japan's
Emperor and has been called Japan's Imperial Constitution in contrast to the post-
World War II constitution wherein the Emperor is relegated to a status of symbolic
head of state. Id. at 298; KENP6 art. 1.
29. Kades, supra note 26, at 218. The Potsdam Declaration was the product of a
July 1945 meeting in Potsdam, Germany between the heads of state from the United
States, Great Britain, and China. The document outlined the terms for.Japan's sur-
render and post-war expectations, including the democratization of Japan's political
system. Japan had to meet the Declaration's conditions prior to the termination of
post-war occupation. Potsdam Declaration, reprinted in 2 POLITICAL REORIENTATION,
supra note 26, at 413.
30. This directive, entitled "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System" and
designated SWNCC-228, is discussed in Ward, supra note 26, at 989-90.
31. McNelly, supra note 26, at 179-80.
32. Both directives set forth civilian control of the military as a check against gov-
erment sponsored militarism. Ward, supra note 26, at 990 (SWNCC-228); McNelly,
supra note 26, at 179-80 (Byrnes directive).
33. Hussey, supra note 26, at 95-97.
34. Id. at 98.
35. Id.
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draft3 6 made only token changes to the Meiji Constitution.3 7 Important
for Article 9 purposes, however, the Matsumoto draft contained an
express provision governing military troops.3 8 This provision looked to
the future and it was only to be utilized ifJapan were allowed to rearm.
The committee argued, "if Japan [is] permitted to join the United
Nations Organization, the need for rearmament might actually arise in
order that she may fulfill her obligations under its charter."'3 9 With an
express provision governing the military, Japan could meet U.N. obliga-
tions without the necessity of a constitutional amendment. MacArthur
found the Matsumoto draft unacceptable and rejected it.40 Later drafts
contained no express provision governing the military.
To clarify basic principles and to expedite constitutional revision,
MacArthur authorized his own Government Section41 to draft a model
constitution to guide future Japanese revision efforts. 4 2 He outlined
three basic concepts that he wanted included in the model.43 One con-
cept made the Emperor responsible to the will of the people, another
ended Japan's feudal system, and the third became the predecessor to
Article 9:
War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces
it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its
own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the
world for its defense and its protection.
No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no
rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.
44
At the time, it appeared that MacArthur had initiated this war
renunciation provision. In later years, however, MacArthur wrote that
Prime Minister Shidehara privately suggested the idea to him even
36. The Matsumoto draft was not a new document, but rather a set of proposed
alterations to the Meiji Constitution. See Fujn, supra note 28, at 283-84. Instead of
submitting a formal draft constitution, the committee simply provided a "Gist of the
Revision of the Constitution" and a "General Explanation of the Constitutional Revi-
sion Drafted by the Government." Hussey, supra note 26, at 98.
37. For example, Article 3 of the Meiji Constitution, which read, "[t]he Emperor
is sacred and inviolable" became "[t]he Emperor is supreme and inviolable." Gist of
the Revision of the Constitution, art. 1, reprinted in 2 PoLrrmcAL REORIENTATION, supra note
26, at 617. Also, Meiji Constitution Article 11, which states "[the Emperor has the
supreme command of the Army and Navy," was changed to, "[t]he Emperor has the
supreme command of the armed forces." Id.
38. Id. See also General Explanation of the Constitutional Revision Drafted by the Govern-
ment, reprinted in 2 POLITICAL REORIENTATION, supra note 26, at 620-21 (explaining
clauses dealing with the military).
39. General Explanation of the Constitutional Revision Drafted by the Government, reprinted
in 2 POLITICAL REORIENTATION, supra note 26, at 621.
40. See Hussey, supra note 26, at 102.
41. The Government Section was established in October 1945 as part of the
occupational organization. Basically, the Government Section advised MacArthur on
the restructuring of the Japanese government and suggested possible governmental
reform. See Hussey, supra 26, at 91; Kades, supra note 26, at 219.
42. Kades, supra note 26, at 223.
43. Hussey, supra note 26, at 102.
44. Id.
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before the Matsumoto draft was completed.4 5
Some critics question MacArthur's statement that Shidehara first
suggested Article 9 and charge that if Shidehara really had formulated
Article 9 he would have included it in the Matsumoto draft, or at least
publicized the fact that he had authored it.46 While Shidehara organ-
ized the Matsumoto Committee, the conservative Matsumoto dominated
Committee activities. 4 7 Kenzo Takayanagi, distinguished Chairman of
Japan's Commission on the Constitution, 4 8 studied the matter thor-
oughly and concluded that Article 9 originated with Shidehara.
Takayanagi wrote:
Shidehara behaved as if Article 9 were proposed by MacArthur,
although he never clearly said so. If he had said that the proposal was his
and not MacArthur's, it might have been rejected by the Cabinet.
Shidehara was diplomatic enough to know this. So Cabinet Members...
thought that the proposal was made by MacArthur and not by Shidehara.
After this [Cabinet] meeting, Shidehara told a number of his close friends
that 'Article 9 did not come from abroad' and that it was his own
proposal. 49
Circumstances surrounding the offering of MacArthur's constitu-
tional model to Japanese leaders provide another common basis for the
"forced-constitution" charge. When General Courtney Whitney, head
of the occupational Government Section, offered the document to the
Japanese Cabinet, he suggested that quick action on constitutional revi-
sion was necessary to avert danger to the Emperor system.5 0 The Soviet
Union, Britain and Australia, all members of the Far Eastern Commis-
sion (FEC),5 1 organized to oversee the occupation, wanted to try the
45. For MacArthur's description of his meeting with Shidehara, see MAcARTHUR,
supra note 26, at 302-03. Shidehara's motives were not without subtleties. It is possi-
ble that Shidehara offered the no-war clause to eliminate the specter of an Imperial
military threat and thereby save the Emperor system. McNelly, supra note 26, at 185.
46. SuEYosHi OHTANI, WHO Is To BE TRIED? 72-73 (1978). Former Prime Minis-
ter Yoshida also believed Article 9 originated with MacArthur, not with Shidehara.
SHIGERU YOSHIDA, THE YOSHIDA MEMOIRS: THE STORY OF JAPAN IN CRISIS 137 (2d
ed. 1973).
47. OHTANI, supra note 46, at 161.
48. The Commission on the Constitution was created in 1956 to examine the
constitution and make amendment recommendations if necessary. Although the
Commission made no recommendations for amendment, its seven-year study was an
important evaluation of the constitution. For Takayanagi's account of the Commis-
sion's work, see Kenzo Takayanagi, Some Reminiscences ofJapan's Commission on the Con-
stitution, in THE CoNsTrrrrION OFJAPAN 71 (Dan F. Henderson ed., 1968).
49. Id. at 87.
50. Kades, supra note 26, at 228.
51. The Far Eastern Commission consisted of the eleven nations that had been at
war with Japan. The Commission provided an international forum to discuss Japan's
compliance with the Potsdam Declaration. The Commission also had power to
review MacArthur's actions as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Deci-
sions were made by majority vote, with the U.S., Soviet Union, Britain, and China
holding veto power over any decision. Kades, supra note 26, at 217-18.
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Emperor on charges of war crimes. 5 2 MacArthur felt that quick accept-
ance of a democratic constitution would preempt the newly organized
FEC from getting too involved in the occupation, and thus preserve the
Emperor system. 53 Matsumoto interpreted Whitney's message as a
threat to the person, not the institution of the Emperor. 54 Japanese
documentation of the meeting, however, records no such interpreta-
tion. 55 Striving for hasty reform, Whitney also threatened to go public
with MacArthur's draft,5 6 something the Japanese leadership wished to
avoid for fear that the public would embrace its democratic principles
more readily than those outlined in the soundly criticized Matsumoto
draft.5 7
Even if one interprets this pressure as forcing the constitution on
Japan's post-war leadership it is apparent that not only MacArthur, but
the Japanese public as well supported the document. A public-opinion
poll taken by the newspaper Mainichi Shimbun in May, 1946, found that
seventy percent of those polled supported Article 9 and the renuncia-
tion of war, while only twenty-eight percent opposed it.58 Alfred
Oppler, a participant in the occupational reforms, wrote: "One had only
to read the newspapers and speak to the man on the street... to realize
that there were powerful movements among the people of enthusiastic
support of Occupation objectives." 5 9 Others have also documented
public support for demilitarization and for constitutional reform.60
In summary, the seeds of Article 9 and the water that nourished
them were Japanese, despite the dominant presence of U.S. occupa-
tional planters and tillers. The pacifist language of Article 9 was sug-
52. See McNelly, supra note 26, at 187; D. C. S. Sissons, The Pacifist Clause of the
Japanese Constitution, 37 INT'L AFF. 45, 47 (1961).
53. McNelly, supra note 26, at 188. In a meeting with Chief Cabinet Secretary
Wataru Narahashi, Kades and Hussey from the Government Section expressed the
opinion that "it was absolutely necessary that the Japanese government forestall a
Far Eastern Commission draft by sponsoring a constitution sufficiently drastic that
the FEC could make no objections to it." Id. at 187-88. In light of the FEC's power
to review MacArthur's actions as Supreme Commander, preemption of FEC involve-
ment in the occupation was probably aimed at preserving more than just the
Emperor system.
54. THEODORE McNELLY, CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN 41 (1963).
55. Two Japanese officials who were present at the meeting recorded summaries
of Whitney's remarks; neither mentioned a personal threat to the Emperor. Kades,
supra note 26, at 229-30.
56. See id. at 229.
57. Kades recorded public reaction to the Matsumoto Draft: "A storm of protest
followed the publication of the [Matsumoto Draft] because of the superficial changes
in the Meiji Constitution. A virtual flood of unfavorable editorials, letters to the edi-
tor, and press releases of opposition political parties engulfed the Cabinet ... ." Id.
at 222.
58. MAINICHI SHIMBUN, May 27, 1946, at 2.
59. OPPLER, supra note 26, at 47.
60. See Maki, supra note 26, at 13-14. During the constitutional debate in the Diet,
Tetsu Katayama expressed Socialist Party support for the new constitution largely
because of Article 9, which "has by no means been given or dictated from outside but
is an expression of a strong current of thought which has been running in the hearts
of the Japanese people." Kades, supra note 26, at 242.
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gested by Prime Minister Shidehara, not General MacArthur. Further,
the Japanese public enthusiastically supported Article 9. Even under the
cloud of foreign occupation, the overwhelmingly one-sided constitu-
tional vote in the newly elected House of Representatives is impres-
sive.6 1 This public support, combined with the likelihood that
Shidehara suggested the idea behind Article 9, make the origin of the
provision appear to be Japanese.
B. Legislative History of Article 9
The various revisions of Article 9 provide insight into its framers' origi-
nal intent. As the whole constitution of Japan went through seven revi-
sions between MacArthur's notes and the final version adopted by the
Diet, American andJapanese framers made two major changes of Article
9.
1. Deletion of MacArthur's Ban on Self-Defense
Once MacArthur asked for a model constitution, the Government Sec-
tion immediately organized a Steering Committee composed of Com-
mander Alfred R. Hussey, Colonel Charles L. Kades, and Lieutenant
Colonel Milo E. Rowell to oversee the work.6 2 The Steering Committee
coordinated the work of seven Government Section committees, each
addressing separate portions of the model constitution: civil rights, the
judiciary, the executive, the legislature, local government, finance, and
the Emperor. 63 Of the remaining areas not addressed by committees,
Hussey drafted the preamble and Kades worked on the section that
became Article 9.64
Colonel Kades, who reworked MacArthur's notes, made minor
changes of terminology in Article 9, and a major change regarding self-
defense. MacArthur had included the phrase "even for preserving its
own security" behind the renunciation of war and the use of force. 65
Kades removed the phrase because he felt it violated Japan's inherent
right to self-defense. 66 Thus, the first revision of Article 9 deleted
explicit language that would have constitutionally prevented military
self-defense by Japan. 6 7 This first major change undercuts the absolute
61. The vote was 421-8. Hussey, supra note 26, at 111. See infra note 89 and
accompanying text. But see Ward, supra note 26, at 1005 (one-sided vote is
misleading).
62. Kades, supra note 26, at 225. See also Hussey, supra note 26, at 102 (listing the
members' full names and rank).
63. Kades, supra note 26, at 225.
64. Id. at 226.
65. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
66. Kades later wrote: "I believed it was unrealistic to ban a nation from exercis-
ing its inherent right of self-preservation." Kades, supra note 26, at 236.
67. Article 9 in the Government Section draft read:
War, as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force, is
forever abolished as a means of settling disputes with other nations.
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"will never be maintained" language of the ratified Article 9, and opens
the door for self-defense forces.
Article 9 was in this Government Section form when Brigadier Gen-
eral Whitney presented the model draft to Japanese leaders in the Cabi-
net meeting described above.68 After accepting the basic tenets of the
draft, members of the Shidehara Cabinet drafted a Japanese version and
then met with Government Section personnel to reach a compromise
proposal to submit to the Japanese public.69 The compromise draft
made minor changes, selecting the term "renounced" instead of "abol-
ished" to refer to Japan's right to wage war.70 MacArthur's notes had
included both terms, but the Government Section draft opted for "abol-
ished." 7' Also, the maintenance-of-forces clause was severed from the
right of belligerency, and while the latter remained unrecognized, the
former was simply unauthorized. 7 2 The changing from war "abolished"
to war "renounced" and from troops "not . . . recognized" to "[not]
authorized" suggests a softening of the anti-war, anti-troops message of
Article 9, but apparently these changes were considered sufficiently
minor as to remain consistent with MacArthur's original guidelines.
2. The Ashida Amendment
After two more government draft revisions, neither of which affected
Article 9,73 the constitution went to the Diet, which made the second
major change to Article 9. In the House of Representatives, Hitoshi
Ashida, chairman of the House special committee on the constitution,
added two introductory phrases to the House version of Article 9, one to
each paragraph.74 After the changes, Paragraph 1 read: "Aspiring sin-
cerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people, forever, renounce war..." Paragraph 2 began: "For the above
purpose .... 75
The maintenance of land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential,
and the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
First Government Draft of Constitution, reprinted in 2 POLITICAL REORIENTATION, supra note
26, at 625. Compare supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (MacArthur draft).
68. See supra notes 50, 54-57 and accompanying text.
69. Hussey, supra note 26, at 107.
70. Second Government Draft of Constitution (Cabinet Draft), reprinted in 2 POLITICAL
REORIENTATION, supra note 26, at 631.
71. See supra note 67.
72. Second Government Draft of Constitution (Cabinet Draft), reprinted in 2 POLITICAL
REORIENTATION, supra note 26, at 631.
73. See Third Government Draft of Constitution, reprinted in 2 POLITICAL REORIENTA-
TION, supra note 26, at 637; Fourth Government Draft of Constitution, reprinted in 2 POLIT-
ICAL REORIENTATION, supra note 26, at 643.
74. Kades, supra note 26, at 236.
75. The full text of Article 9, as adopted by the House of Representatives, now
read:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people, forever, renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, or
the threat or use of force, as a means of settling disputes with other nations.
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These two introductory phrases may indicate that Article 9 is not as
restrictive as it appears. Ashida's vague terms suggest that troops may
never be maintained "for the above purpose" of "war" and "the threat
or use of force, as a means of settling disputes with other nations,"'7 6 but
could be allowed for other purposes. In this sense, troops would be
banned only from offensive activities, but not from self-defense or U.N.
international sanction actions. 7 7 In 1953, Ashida argued that this lan-
guage of the constitution allowed the creation of Japanese military
troops for use in "national self-defense and international sanction."7 8
Ashida's interpretation was not unappreciated by members of the
Government Section. Colonel Kades wrote that he interpreted Ashida's
amendment to allow future troops for U.N. participation as well as for
self-defense, because he had already deleted the "even for preserving its
own security" language from MacArthur's original notes.79 Conse-
quently, self-defense was already recognized as a sovereign right, and
any expansion of that right had to concern U.N. participation. Further-
more, Kades felt that the Ashida amendment was calculated to address
concerns held by leading Cabinet members that Article 9 could prevent
Japan's admission to the U.N. 80 The FEC also believed that the Ashida
amendment permitted rearmament, and responded by calling for a
guarantee that only civilians would occupy Cabinet offices, thus assuring
civilian control over a future military.8 '
While some outside observers may have realized the implications of
Ashida's amendment, it is doubtful that the Japanese legislators who
voted for the new constitution either knew of or supported Ashida's
original intent. When Ashida argued in 1953 that he purposefully
changed Article 9 to allow a future interpretation permitting self-
defense or international sanction, commentators called him a "turn-
coat" who had changed his interpretation supporting the official govern-
For the above purpose, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war poten-
tial, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not
be recognized.
Draft of Japanese Constitution (As amended by the House of Representatives), reprinted in 2
POLITICAL REORIENTATION, supra note 26, at 649.
76. Id.
77. This argument assumes that the Article 9 language referring to war and the
settling of international disputes applies only to wars involvingJapan and the settling
of Japanese disputes with other nations, as opposed to settling international disputes
handled by the U.N. Otherwise, the use of U.N. military sanctions would be clearly
unconstitutional and Ashida's contention to the contrary, infra note 78 and accompa-
nying text, would be wrong. Therefore, the assumption that Article 9 applies only to
Japanese disputes is implicit in this argument.
78. Takayanagi, supra note 48, at 84.
79. Kades, supra note 26, at 236-37.
80. Id. The concerned leaders included such prominent figures as former Prime
Minister Shidehara, Prime Minister Yoshida (who replaced Shidehara as a result of
Japan's first post-war election in May 1946), Matsumoto, and Tokujiro Kanamori, the
state minister in charge of giving official constitutional interpretations. Id. at 237. See
also Hussey, supra note 26, at 110 (Yoshida election).
81. Kades, supra note 26, at 237-38.
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ment position that Article 9 banned troops for any purpose.8 2
Takayanagi argued this "turncoat" charge was refuted by a 1946 pam-
phlet in which Ashida's view of Article 9 differed from the govern-
ment's.8 3 Significantly, however, his 1946 published view did not
include his later utilization of Article 9, paragraph 2 as a limiting tool.8 4
Later, Ashida admitted to the Commission on the Constitution that he
did not tell the Diet of his Article 9 intentions, fearing that if they
became known the Americans would oppose his amendment.8 5
In contrast to Ashida's secret intent, the Cabinet, which introduced
and sponsored the new constitution, read Article 9 differently. Prime
Minister Yoshida, while arguing in support of Article 9, clearly
renounced the use of Japanese troops even for self-defense:
Of late years most wars have been waged in the name of self-defense.
This is the case of the Manchurian Incident, and so is the War of Greater
East Asia. The suspicion concerning Japan today is that she is a warlike
nation, and there is no knowing when she may rearm herself, wage a war
of reprisal and threaten the peace of the world .... I think that the first
thing we should do today is to set right this misunderstanding.86
Takayanagi also reported that when he inquired into the meaning of
Article 9 during the constitutional debate, he was told by government
spokesman Tokujiro Kanamori that "the official interpretation was that
Japan retained a right of national self-defense in international law, but
by virtue of the second paragraph [of Article 9], she could neither wage
war nor maintain an armed force--even for purposes of national self-
defense."8 7 Although Diet members who voted for Article 9 knew of the
official government interpretation, they were probably unaware of
Ashida's interpretation. Therefore, ratifying votes for Article 9 must be
read to support the advertised interpretation of the time, and not the
subtle Ashida Amendment view.
3. Final Ratification
Both houses of the Diet promptly adopted the constitution in its final
82. Takayanagi, supra note 48, at 84.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Sissons, supra note 52, at 48. The Americans (at least Col. Kades) and the
FEC realized the possibilities of the Ashida Amendment, and the latter acted to limit
those possibilities. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. Therefore, either
Ashida was unaware of the U.S. and FEC recognition and approval of his amend-
ment, or his silence was aimed at a different audience: the Diet and the Japanese
public. On the heels of defeat in World War II, it is possible that many members of
the Diet would have opposed the Ashida Amendment had they known its true pur-
pose of constitutionally allowing future rearmament.
86. Kades, supra note 26, at 237. In support of Yoshida's concern about misuse of
self-defense wars, Kades notes that General Tojo, who was both Prime Minister and
Army Minister during World War II, testified at his war crimes trial that Japanese
wartime efforts, including the bombing of Pearl Harbor, were not aggressive acts but
self-defense. Id.
87. Takayanagi, supra note 48, at 83.
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form8 8 by near unanimous margins.8 9 Although this wide margin of vic-
tory in both houses suggests almost universal acceptance of the docu-
ment, these votes were taken while U.S. troops still occupied Japan.
Oppler noted that one participant felt more members of the House of
Peers wanted to vote against the constitution, but voted for it because
they viewed adoption as the quickest way to end the occupation. 90
Clearly, Japan's elite, including the post-surrender Cabinet and House
of Peers, were less than enthusiastic about seeing Japan's traditional
government system dismantled as democracy swept in.9 1 Popular sup-
port was strong, however, as exhibited by the vote in the democratically
elected House of Representatives. The endurance of the constitution in
its adopted form, even after the occupation, further demonstrates con-
tinued popular support.
The Imperial Privy Council, still under the Emperor's control prior
to adoption of the new constitution, debated the revised constitution
and approved it on October 29, 1946.92 On November 3, 1946, the
Emperor released the following Imperial Rescript:
I rejoice that the foundation for the construction of a new Japan has
been laid according to the will of the Japanese people, and hereby sanc-
tion and promulgate the amendments93 of the Imperial Japanese Consti-
tution effected following the consultation with the Privy Council and the
decisions of the Imperial Diet made in accordance with Article 73 of the
said Constitution.9 4
On May 3, 1947, exactly six months after the Emperor's announcement,
the new constitution ofJapan took effect, 95 carrying with it not only the
Emperor's endorsement but, more importantly, the overwhelming sup-
port of the most representative and responsive legislature in Japan's
88. Minor changes were made by the House of Peers leaving Article 9 as it now
stands. KENP6 art. 9.
89. On August 24, 1946, the House of Representatives adopted the constitution
by a vote of 421 to eight. One month later, the House of Peers voted 298 to two in
favor of adoption. Minor changes by the House of Peers required a second vote by
the House of Representatives on October 7, 1946, recorded as 342 to five for adop-
tion. Hussey, supra note 26, at 1. Maki has elsewhere noted that careful scholarship
has been unable officially to verify these voting statistics. "There was apparently no
roll call vote. The two negative votes in the House of Peers were apparently attrib-
uted to the two members who spoke against the draft; the five in the lower house to
members ... who stated that they voted negatively." Mad, supra note 26, at 9 n.8.
90. The participant suggested that this sentiment was held by members in both
houses, but Oppler felt it only applied to the House of Peers, and not to the newly
elected House of Representatives. OPPLER, supra note 26, at 48-49.
91. See Ward, supra note 26, at 1005 ("In the House of Peers in particular one
frequently detects a distinct preference for many of the institutions and practices of
the Meiji Constitution.").
92. Hussey, supra note 26, at 111.
93. The New Constitution was passed as an amendment to the Meiji Constitution,
but for all intents and purposes completely replaced it. See id. at 113. For a review of
the sweeping changes implemented by the New Constitution, see id. at 113-18.
94. Imperial Rescript, 2 POLITICAL REORIENTATION, supra note 26, at 670.
95. Hussey, supra note 26, at 1.
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C. Changing the Meaning of Article 9
If Article 9, when adopted, did not allow even the existence ofJapanese
troops, foreign deployment of military troops would now be unconstitu-
tional absent a subsequent change in the meaning of Article 9. Consti-
tutional change can occur in Japan in four ways:
One is by ordinary legislation, in which the Diet adapts and applies
the constitution to changing conditions. Another is by judicial interpreta-
tion of the constitution, whereby the meaning of the constitution is modi-
fied in a way similar to the way in which the Constitution of the United
States is changed. A third way is by textually amending the constitution. A
fourth way is by the government's interpretations of its own powers, as
when the government decided it could dissolve the lower house, even
though it did not have a vote of no confidence. 9 7
The creation of Japan's military, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
exemplifies how constitutional change can occur in Japan without tex-
tual amendment. The existence of military troops and machinery, even
for defensive purposes, violates the clear language of Article 9 and its
interpretation when adopted.98 The government's voluntary abandon-
ment of its inherent right to self-defense in 1946 essentially left Japan
with no troops, even for self-defense purposes. Yet, by the early 1950's,
the government had changed its position, with MacArthur's blessing,9 9
and decided that the constitution did not prevent war potential for pure
self-defense. 10 0 With this new interpretation, the government pro-
ceeded to create the SDF. 10
96. National Diet, supra note 7, at 147.
97. Theodore McNelly, Constitution and Law Reform in Postwar Japan (presentation
at MacArthur Memorial Seminar, November 6-7, 1975) in MACARTHUR MEMORIAL
LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES, THE OCCUPATION OFJAPAN: THE PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR
ON THE OCCUPATION OFJAPAN AND ITS LEGACY TO THE POSTWAR WORLD 2, 10 (1975).
98. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
99. MacArthur's position had also changed between 1946 and 1950. In 1946, he
announced to the Japanese people that through Article 9 "Japan surrenders rights
inherent in her own sovereignty and renders her future security and very survival
subject to the good faith and justice of the peace loving peoples of the world." Gen-
eral MacArthur's Announcement Concerning the Proposed New Constitution for Japan, 6 March
1946, reprinted in 2 PoLTICA.. REORIENTATION, supra note 26, at 657.
With the Korean War looming, MacArthur's 1950 New Year's address to the Japa-
nese people had a different tone: "Article 9 is based upon the highest of moral ide-
als, but by no sophistry of reasoning can it be interpreted as complete negation of the
inalienable right of self-defense against unprovoked attack." MACARTHUR, supra note
26, at 304. See also OrrANI, supra note 46, at 182 (identification of MacArthur's
speech as 1950 New Year's speech).
100. Prime Minister Yoshida's 1952 expression to this effect is found in Sissons,
supra note 52, at 52: "It was on 6 March 1952 in the discussions on the Budget that
Mr[.] Yoshida made his famous 'slip of the tongue.' In reply to questioners he said
that what the constitution prohibited was war potential as means of settling interna-
tional disputes; it did not prohibit war potential for self-defense."
101. On June 8, 1950, MacArthur wrote to Prime Minister Yoshida calling for the
creation of a 75,000 strong "Police Reserve." OHTANI, supra note 46, at 13, 181.
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Approval of all three branches of government was necessary to cre-
ate the SDF. First, the executive branch changed its position regarding
the meaning of Article 9 as it applied to self-defense. 10 2 Second, the
Diet legislatively approved the measure by passing the SDF law in
1954.103 Finally, Japan's Supreme Court has repeatedly dodged and
implicitly rejected challenges that the SDF is unconstitutional. 10 4 Thus,
SDF constitutionality relies not on vague inferences about self-defense
from the Ashida Amendment but rather is supported by Japan's execu-
tive policy, legislative action, andjudicial review. Through this process
of acceptance, the constitutionality of the SDF has been established with
a practical effect resembling a constitutional amendment.' 0 5
Extending the right of self-defense to include the sending of Japa-
nese troops abroad must also find support either in textual amendment
or alteration by Japan's three branches of government. In the absence
of such changes, foreign SDF deployment is unconstitutional.
1. Textual Amendment
The first method of changing the constitution is through textual amend-
ment. Since Japan's constitution has never been formally amended, the
text of Article 9 remains as it was in 1947. The renunciation-of-war
clause remains controversial, however, and has played a central role in
the movement to revise the constitution. 10 6 The most organized revi-
sion attempt occurred in 1956 when the Diet created the Commission
on the Constitution. 10 7 Chaired by Kenzo Takayanagi, the Commission
examined the constitution to determine problems and to suggest revi-
sions. 108 Despite the majority of revisionists on the Commission, Chair-
man Takayanagi guided the discussions evenhandedly, and ultimately
the Commission made no recommendations for revision but simply pub-
lished all expressed views. 10 9 Consequently, the expected constitutional
One month later, MacArthur authorized an additional 100,000 troops to be added to
the force. MAcARTHUR, supra note 26, at 337. From this beginning, the force evolved
into the "Security Guards" on October 15, 1952, and then the "Self-Defense Forces"
on June 1, 1954. OrTANi, supra note 46, at 181.
102. See supra note 100. Compare Takayanagi, supra note 48, at 83 (the official gov-
ernment interpretation of Article 9 during the constitutional debates).
103. Jieitai ho, Law No. 165 of 1954.
104. See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
105. The major difference, of course, is the permanence of the change. A constitu-
tional amendment allowing the SDF could only be abandoned via the passing of
another amendment. In contrast, the present sanctioning of the SDF is more tenu-
ous and could be reversed by a subsequent court or legislature without constitutional
amendment. Otherwise, the executive, legislative, and judicial acceptance of the SDF
are functionally equivalent to allowing its existence.
106. For an excellent discussion of the history and rationale ofJapan's revisionist
movement, see H. Fukui, Twenty Years of Revision, in THE CONsTrrTiON OFJAPAN 41
(Dan F. Henderson ed., 1968).
107. Takayanagi, supra note 48, at 71.
108. Id.
109. Dan F. Henderson, Perspectives on the Japanese Constitution After Twenty Years, in
THE CoNsrrtrrxoN OFJAPAN xi-xii & n.2 (Dan F. Henderson ed., 1968) (Henderson's
introduction to the collected essays).
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revision never materialized, and experts characterize future amendment
as "unlikely."10
2. Judicial Interpretation: The Case Law of Article 9
Japan's Supreme Court has addressed Article 9 in only a handful of
cases, none of which has decided the issue of sending troops abroad.
While the Supreme Court has never squarely faced the constitutionality
of foreign deployment of troops, other Article 9 cases may support an
interpretation allowing foreign deployment. Article 9 cases have
reached the Supreme Court in two contexts: challenges to U.S.-Japanese
defense treaties and challenges to the SDF. In each case, the Supreme
Court has upheld defense treaties and allowed continued SDF existence.
Analysis of the various rationales behind these decisions helps explain
why the SDF is constitutional, while sending troops abroad is not.
a. Constitutionality of Defense Treaties
Sunakawa is the landmark case in the context of defense treaty chal-
lenges.'11 In Sunakawa, Supreme Court dicta recognized the inherent
right to self-defense as compatible with Article 9,112 and thereby pro-
vided the initial impetus behind later arguments that the SDF is
constitutional.
In the 1959 Sunakawa decision, seven Japanese protesters were
arrested for trespassing on a U.S. military base while protesting the
extension of an air base runway. Since the Japan-U.S. security agree-
ment justifying the base contained harsher trespass penalties than the
common criminal code, the defendants had standing to challenge the
treaty's constitutionality because of its adverse impact on them. The
trial court found the defendants not guilty because the security treaty
with the United States was unconstitutional under Article 9's prohibition
against maintaining "war potential." 113 The Supreme Court unani-
mously reversed, holding that U.S. forces under the security treaty were
not under Japanese control and therefore did not violate the ban on
Japanese war potential. 1 4 In dicta, the court described Japan's right to
self-defense:
110. Lawrence W. Beer,Japan's Constitutional System and Its Judicial Interpretation, 17
LAw IN JAPAN 7, 13 (1984).
111. 13 KeishOi 3225 (Judgment of Dec. 16, 1959, in the Saikosai,Japan's Supreme
Court). An English translation appears in JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION
IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1948-60, 298 (1964). Helpful com-
mentaries include Alfred C. Oppler, The Sunakawa Case - Its Legal and Political Implica-
tions, 76 POL. Sci. Q. 241 (1961); Hideo Wada, Decisions Under Article 9 of the
Constitution - The Sunakawa, Eniwa and Naganuma Decisions, 9 LAw IN JAPAN 117, 120-23
(1976).
112. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
113. Japan v. Sakata, (Tokyo Dt. Ct.) Judgment of Mar. 30, 1959, 1 Kokeishii 776.
This trial court decision is discussed in Wada, supra note 111, at 119-20.
114. Judgment of Dec. 16, 1959, Saikosai (Supreme Court), 13 Keishfi 3225
(Japan). See also MAKI, supra note 111, at 303-04 (English version).
Vol. 25
1992 Japan's Constitution and U.N. Obligations
[T]he said article renounces what is termed therein war and prohibits
the maintenance of what is termed war potential; naturally, the above in
no way denies the inherent right of self-defense, which our country pos-
sesses as a sovereign nation, and the pacifism of our Constitution has
never provided for either defenselessness or nonresistance. 115
This expression of support for Japan's inherent right to self-defense as
compatible with Article 9 became central to the argument for SDF
constitutionality.
b. SDF Constitutionality
The Japanese Supreme Court, in addressing SDF cases, has avoided
explicit recognition of SDF constitutionality while allowing the military's
continued existence. Japanese courts have most often decided these
cases on legal technicalities, avoiding a direct ruling on the hard issue of
SDF constitutionality.
The first SDF challenge, the Suzuki decision, 11 6 was decided before
Japan's military was even known as the SDF. In 1952, the secretary-
general of Japan's Social Democratic Party, Mosaburo Suzuki, chal-
lenged the creation of the "Police Reserve" as unconstitutional under
the "war potential" provision of Article 9. In its first opportunity to rule
on the constitutionality of Japanese troops, Japan's Supreme Court
unanimously avoided the Article 9 issue and dismissed the case on the
grounds that no concrete legal dispute existed.' 1 7
The Eniwa case' 18 was the first post-Sunakawa case to challenge the
constitutionality of the SDF and, predictably, the prosecution argued
that Japan's inherent right to self-defense, implied by Sunakawa,
extended to the SDF. 119 In Eniwa, two ranchers cut the telephone wires
leading to a neighboring SDF base in order to disrupt training missions
and thereby reduce the associated noise. They were charged with dam-
aging military equipment in violation of the SDF law. The Sapporo Dis-
trict Court refused to extend the Sunakawa dicta to the SDF, and instead
dismissed the case on the grounds that the ranchers' act did not consti-
tute destruction of military property. 120 The case was not appealed.
In 1969, a final challenge to the SDF came in the Naganuma Nike
case. 121 Residents from Naganuma fought a proposal to reclassify a
local forest preserve to allow the Air SDF to construct a Nike missile site.
115. MAKI, supra note 111, at 303.
116. Judgment of Oct. 8, 1952, Saikosai (Supreme Court), 6 Minshii 783. An Eng-
lish version of Suzuki is found in MAKI, supra note 111, at 362.
117. MAKI, supra note 11, at 364.
118. Judgment of Mar. 29, 1967, Sapporo Chisai (Sapporo District Court), 9
Kokeishii 359. The Eniwa case is discussed in Wada, supra note 111, at 123-25.
119. Wada, supra note 111, at 124.
120. Id. at 123-24.
121. Judgment of September 7, 1973, Sapporo Chisai (Sapporo District Court),
HANJI (No. 712) 24. The information used in this Note on the Naganuma Nike case
comes from Robert L. Seymour,Japan's Self-Defense: The Naganuma Case and Its Implica-
tions, 47 PAC. ArF. 421 (1974-5), and Wada, supra note 111, at 125-27.
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The residents argued that the status of the forest could only be changed
for the public good, and since the SDF was unconstitutional, creation of
an SDF missile site could not be in the public interest. They also argued
that destruction of the forest would cause ecological harm, including
flooding. The trial judge held for the residents and enjoined missile site
construction. 12 2 On appeal, the Sapporo High Court reversed the trial
court on the basis of government proposals to remedy potential ecologi-
cal harm adequately and allowed the government to proceed on the mis-
sile site. t28 The High Court's failure to rule on the constitutionality of
SDF left it open for consideration by the trial court on remand. Four
years and twenty-seven hearings later (by this time, the missile site had
been completed) the trial judge ruled the SDF unconstitutional. 124
This September 7, 1973 decision was the first judicial determination
that the SDF was unconstitutional. The government immediately
appealed the case to the Sapporo High Court, which in 1976 quashed
the trial court ruling and dismissed the action because the plaintiffs
lacked standing. 125 In 1982, The Supreme Court sustained the High
Court's decision, 126 thereby vacating the only Japanese court decision to
find the SDF unconstitutional.
Analysis of the Japanese Supreme Court's treatment of Article 9
cases suggests two conclusions. First, the court's refusal to strike down
the SDF as unconstitutional suggests tacit approval of the SDF as per-
missible under the court's notion of Japan's inherent right to self-
defense.' 2 7 The practical effect of the court's inaction is to allow contin-
ued SDF existence. Second, the court's reluctance to hold the SDF
explicitly constitutional suggests judicial discomfort about doing so in
light of clearly contrary constitutional language. The court apparently
prefers that the other branches of government initiate Article 9 altera-
tions. As long as the political response of the electorate is generally
favorable, the court is willing to defer to the Cabinet and Diet.' 2 8
Japan's strong policy of judicial deference is due, in part, to two
important factors. First, Supreme Court judges are appointed by the
122. Seymour, supra note 121, at 426-27.
123. Id. at 427.
124. Id. at 428.
125. Theodore McNelly, The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution, 13
ARMED FORCES & Soc'Y 81, 84 (1986).
126. Id.
127. Admittedly, this point is debatable-the court may have decided each SDF
case on technical grounds, not out of a tacit support for the SDF, but on legitimate
jurisprudential principles compatible with the avoidance of constitutional issues. If
the court truly believed, however, that the SDF was indeed unconstitutional, it seems
improbable that it would continue to allow its existence by not striking it down.
128. In the Sunakawa opinion, the court refused to rule the treaty with the United
States unconstitutional, but rather felt this was "a matter that must be entrusted to
the decision of the cabinet, which possesses the power to conclude treaties, and of
the National Diet, which has the power to approve them; and it ultimately must be left to
the political review of the sovereign people." MAKi, supra note Ill, at 306 (emphasis
added).
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Cabinet. 129 Since the Liberal Democratic Party has dominated the exec-
utive branch since the end of World War II, it is reasonable to believe
that successive cabinets have appointed judges who agree with the phi-
losophy of the majority party. This may explain why the Court has
rarely found Cabinet-sponsored legislation enacted by the Diet uncon-
stitutional.13 0 Also, while judges are to be "independent in the exercise
of their conscience,"1 3 1 Japanese Supreme Court judges are subject to
decennial reviews by the electorate.' 3 2 If the majority of the voters
favor a judge's dismissal, he is dismissed.' 3 3
In light of these constitutional provisions, it is not surprising that
Japan's Supreme Court has deferred to the Diet in Article 9 cases.
Rather than explicitly approving the SDF, the court instead simply
allows it to continue. This way, the court reaches the same result as an
official adjudication on constitutionality without the associated political
fallout. By legislatively adopting the SDF law and judicially allowing it
to stand, Japan has effectively changed its constitution.
This de facto constitutionality, based upon an inherent right to self-
defense, does not necessarily support sending the SDF abroad.1 34 In
the absence ofjudicial willingness to recognize the SDF, a more extreme
holding allowing troop deployment abroad is unlikely. Moreover, the
Diet set up the SDF, whereas no similar legislative or executive provi-
sion authorizes foreign deployment. Because the court has never
approached the issue, there is a complete lack ofjudicial support for the
proposition that sending troops abroad is constitutional.
3. Executive Branch Interpretation
a. Background
Constitutional change can also occur by executive branch interpretation
of its own powers. Prime Minister Yoshida's 1952 dissolution of the
House of Representatives via an imperial rescript is illustrative. 135 The
constitution grants the Cabinet the power to dissolve the lower house,
129. KENP6 art. 6, 2 (Emperor appoints ChiefJudge of Supreme Court "as desig-
nated by the Cabinet"); id. art. 79, 1 (remaining Supreme Court judges are
appointed by the Cabinet).
130. Japan's Supreme Court did not find any Diet-enacted law or executive action
unconstitutional until 1961. MAKi, supra note 111, at xliii.
131. KENP6 art. 76, 3.
132. Id. art. 79, 2.
133. Id. art. 79, 3. Nevertheless, this check is not terribly meaningful because the
public does not closely follow Japanese court decisions. See ARDATH W. BURKS, THE
GOVERNMENT OFJAPAN 161 (1964). A highly emotional issue such as the constitution-
ality of the SDF, however, would probably attract public attention.
134. Self-defense and foreign troop deployment are clearly separate issues. It is
one thing to maintain troops for protection of the homeland, and quite another to
dispatch these defensive troops abroad, for whatever purposes. Even during discus-
sions surrounding the legitimacy of the Ashida Amendment, proponents distin-
guished the military use of troops for national self-defense and for international
sanction. See Takayanagi, supra note 48, at 84; Kades, supra note 26, at 237.
135. For a thorough discussion of dissolution generally, as well as Yoshida's 1952
dissolution specifically, see D. C. S. Sissons, Dissolution of the Japanese Lower House, in
Cornell International Law Journal
but seemingly only after the lower house passes a vote of no confidence
towards the Cabinet.'8 6 Yoshida's decision to dissolve the House of
Representatives without a previous vote of no confidence unilaterally
expanded the meaning of Japan's constitution. House Member Gizo
Tomabechi petitioned the Supreme Court to find the dissolution uncon-
stitutional and invalid, but the Court dismissed the complaint due to a
lack of original jurisdiction.1 - 7 Thereafter, Cabinet power to dissolve
the House without a no-confidence vote became generally accepted.1 8
Although Yoshida's dissolution of the House of Representatives
was done unilaterally, sending troops abroad can only be done with the
agreement of the Diet. The SDF law allows mobilization only when nec-
essary to defend the nation against armed aggression from external
forces. ' 3 9 This mobilization decision can be made by the Prime Minister
but is subject to the Diet's consent, except in cases of extreme emer-
gency. 14 0 Because even domestic deployment is subject to Diet consent,
foreign deployment is not possible without the Diet's support. More-
over, the SDF law does not consider or authorize sending SDF troops
abroad.'41 Therefore, if the executive branch desired SDF deployment
on foreign soil, it would need either to amend the SDF law or to pass a
new authorization bill. Both methods would require Diet approval.
The executive branch sought foreign deployment in the fall of 1990
when an international coalition of military forces joined to enforce U.N.
sanctions against the Iraqis invading Kuwait. In response to interna-
tional pressure, mainly from the United States, Japanese Prime Minister
Kaifu introduced a measure to authorize deployment of SDF troops to
the Persian Gulf.142 This unprecedented proposal, if enacted, would
have effectively altered the scope and meaning of Article 9 without a
formal textual amendment. To effect this type of change, the Cabinet
needed the support of the Diet and, implicitly, the support of the Japa-
nese people. This attempted constitutional change of Article 9 via the
Cabinet avenue failed, leaving a strengthened respect for the validity of
Article 9 as it applies to foreign troop deployment.
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY RESEARCH SCHOOL OF PACIFIC STUDIES, PAPERS ON
MODERN JAPAN 91, 115-23 (1968) (Yoshida dissolution).
136. KENP6 art. 69: "If the House of Representatives passes a non-confidence res-
olution, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless
the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten (10) days."
137. Judgment of April 15, 1953, Saikosai (Supreme Court), 7 Minshii 305 (Japan).
An English translation can be found in MAxi, supra note 111, at 366.
138. See ROBERT E. WARD,JAPAN'S POLITICAL SYSTEM 95 (1967); Sissons, supra note
135, at 136.
139. Jieitai ho, Law No. 165 of 1954, art. 76, § 1.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Edward Neilan, Japanese Plan to Deploy Troops in Gulf Stirs Instant Discontent,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1990, at A9.
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b. Japan's Response to International Pressure
In Japan's first response to the call for a multinational force in the Per-
sian Gulf, the government sought 100 volunteers to join a Gulf medical
team.1 43 Few citizens responded, however, and eventually only seven-
teen people, some of them government employees, went to the Gulf.144
All members of the team returned before war broke out in January
1991.145
The failure of the volunteer plan forced government officials to look
elsewhere forJapanese personnel to send to the Gulf. The military was
the logical place to look. Constitutional constraints and public opinion,
however, complicated the decision. Prime Minister Kaifu14 6 had three
choices:
1. Recognize the constitutional prohibition against sending troops
abroad imposed by Article 9 and refuse to participate militarily in the
Gulf.
2. Make sending troops abroad for U.N. purposes legal by enacting a
constitutional amendment.
3. Make sending troops abroad for U.N. purposes legal by extra-consti-
tutional means; that is, amending the SDF law or enacting a new deploy-
ment authorization law.
Kaifu decided on the third option. On September 27, 1990, the
Prime Minister announced a plan for the deployment of a "United
Nations Peace Cooperation Team" to Saudi Arabia. 147 The group
would comprise "civil service personnel and members of the Self
Defense Forces."' 48 The plan sidestepped Article 9 by placing SDF per-
sonnel on temporary leave from their official military role of defending
Japan and into the peace cooperation force. 14 9 That way, they would
not technically be members ofJapan's military. As for civilian recruits,
143. David Butts, Plan to SendJapanese Troops to Gulf Appears Dead, UPI, Nov. 1, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
144. Id.
145. Report from Japan, YOMIURI NEws SERVICE, Jan. 3, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wires File.
146. As Prime Minister, Kaifu led the Cabinet (selected by the Prime Minister) in
fulfilling executive functions. He was also the leader of Japan's dominant Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). Japan's Prime Minister is selected by the Diet, each party
placing its respective leader on the ballot. Thus, the majority party in effect selects
the Prime Minister, who has usually been a Member of the LDP. For more details of
the Prime Minister's function, see WARD, supra note 138, at 92.
Kaifu became Prime Minister in August 1989 after scandals toppled two more
prominent predecessors. Kaifu Sworn In As Japan's New Prime Minister, REUTERS, Aug.
10, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. Kaifu was selected probably
more for his clean image than his leadership qualities, and his power base within the
LDP was not believed to be strong. Vision ofJapan as U.N. Peacekeeper Attacked by Left,
Right, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. His
tenure ended in November 1991, after he decided not to run for re-election. KYODO
NEws SERVICE, Nov. 5, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
147. Neilan, supra note 142.
148. Irene Kunii,Japan's Kaifu Calls on Legislators to Back Gulf Troop Plan, REUTERS,
Oct. 12, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
149. Neilan, supra note 142.
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Kaifu told a questioning reporter, "If you want to join, just raise your
hand. You will be welcome."15 0 Kaifu expected the peace cooperation
personnel merely to support existing forces in the region, not to engage
in combat: "This group will not do anything that will involve military
activity or the threat of military action."' 5 1
Prior to its introduction in the Diet, the Cabinet formally had to
draft the proposal. 15 2 Compromise in the Cabinet153 produced a more
militaristic proposal than the bill originally proposed by Kaifu. The
Cabinet proposal called for SDF forces, as opposed to resigned or
retired SDF members, to go to the Persian Gulf and to operate with
significant autonomy once there154 -a response to the military's con-
cern about being sent unarmed into a potential war zone.' 55 Although
these concessions made Cabinet consensus possible, they exposed the
bill to criticism by political opponents in the Diet. The proposal to
establish a U.N. Peace Cooperation Team marked the first government-
sponsored call for sending Japanese troops abroad since the end of
World War 11.156 For the first time, Japan's government sought to
deploy SDF forces in a military role on foreign soil, despite the provi-
sions of Article 9.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. By law, Japan's Cabinet is responsible for developing foreign policy legisla-
tion and for introducing foreign policy bills to the Diet. The Cabinet exercises its
powers through consensus decision-making; compromises are made until all Cabinet
members agree on a proposal. This is done because each individual Cabinet member
is held personally responsible for every official Cabinet decision. WARD, supra note
138, at 94.
153. Two powerful politicians, LDP Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa and former
Prime Minister Noburu Takeshita split with Kaifu over SDF involvement in the U.N.
force. They advocated amending the SDF law to allow uniformed SDF Members to
participate in the Gulf as recognized Members ofJapan's military, but Kaifu opposed
their plan. David E. Sanger, Confrontation in the Gulf. After Silence, Japan's Army Pushes
forArmed Gulf Role, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1990, at Al. The SDF law remained intact,
but Kaifu had to alter his original proposal to gain the support of the LDP's right
wing. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
154. Steven R. Weisman, Japanese Disarray Over Sending Troops to Gulf, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 1990, at AIO.
155. TheJapanese military played a significant role in the proposal's formulation.
Initially, Kaifu tried to exclude Defense Minister Yozo Ishikawa from the discussions
of how to respond to U.S. requests for help. Sanger, supra note 153, at A10. SDF
members grumbled about not being consulted on the possible deployment, and
Kaifu's plan for an unarmed, largely civilian force was heresy to them. "It is non-
sense," said one senior SDF officer. "We would be laughed at as a toy army. Frankly
speaking, I think if I asked my troops to go under those conditions, many would
refuse." Id. The military's position did not go unnoticed and gained support of
influential leaders such as Ozawa. The New York Times reported: "What separates the
current debate from past discussions about the scope ofJapanese power is that this
time the military is hardly sitting on the sidelines." Id.
156. Japan experienced a similar struggle in 1987 when the United States asked for
Japanese minesweepers during its reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in the Iran-Iraq War.
The discussion was not as emotional then and the ultimate decision to allow deploy-
ment came so late that the ships never left port. See id.
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Before introducing the bill to the Diet, the government announced
a new interpretation of Article 9. Relying upon 1961 testimony of an
executive branch official given before the Diet, the government asserted
thatJapan could constitutionally participate in U.N. policing actions. 157
This new interpretation was not self-actuating; 158 the Cabinet needed
Diet support. Diet support was implicitly contingent upon the support
of the Japanese people.
4. Legislative Interpretation
The Cabinet proposal to send SDF troops to the Persian Gulf gave the
Diet an opportunity to effect constitutional change without amendment.
The Diet passed the SDF law in 1954, but never authorized foreign
troop deployment. Consequently, this Cabinet bill was a prerequisite to
military activity in the Gulf. If the Diet passed the law, and the Supreme
Court allowed it to stand, the meaning of Article 9 would be changed
without textual amendment.
From a political standpoint, the Cabinet bill stood a good chance of
passing in the Diet because it needed only majority support in each
house. 15 9 Since Kaifu's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) held a clear
majority in the House of Representatives, the bill was expected to pass
there.160 In the House of Councillors, the LDP had 120 of the 253 seats
aligned with them on the issue.16 1 They needed only 127 votes to win.
Nevertheless, public opposition to the Cabinet bill was stronger
than the government expected. Due to Japan's experience in World
War II, anti-war sentiment and a general distrust of the military are
widespread. 16 2 Five days after the bill was submitted to the Diet, 23,000
157. Japanese Reportedly Change Stand on Troops in Gulf, UPI, Oct. 15, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. Reliance upon a former executive branch official
to provide the legal basis for constitutional change is dubious at best. While the
Executive Branch can independently effect constitutional change, it requires more
than the simple testimony of an executive branch bureaucrat.
158. The Cabinet's interpretation of Article 9 in this situation did not have the
same legal effect that Prime Minister Yoshida's dissolution of the House of Repre-
sentatives had. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. The dissolution could
be done unilaterally, but the Cabinet needed Diet approval to effect change in inter-
preting Article 9. Therefore, the Cabinet's new interpretation did not, in and of
itself, have any legal effect in altering the meaning of Article 9, but rather had the
political effect of making the bill seem more acceptable to the Diet. The new inter-
pretation could only take legal effect if and when the Diet adopted the proposal
reflecting the Cabinet's interpretation, and the interpretation in effect became law.
159. KENP6 art. 56, 2 ("All matters shall be decided in each House, by a majority
of those present, except as elsewhere provided in the Constitution.")
160. "Kaifu's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will pass the bill in the lower
house, where it holds a majority, but the spotlight will be on the opposition-con-
trolled upper house." Kunii, supra note 148.
161. The LDP held 110 seats; the only opposition party to side with the LDP, the
Democratic Socialist Party, held 10. Id.
162. Many people shared the fear expressed by former Cabinet member Masaharu
Gotoda: "IfJapan uses this as an opportunity to start sending troops to other coun-
tries . . . the door will be opened for Japan to become a military superpower."
Mayton NaffJapan's Plan to Send Troops to Gulf in Trouble, UPI, Oct. 23, 1990, available
Cornell International Law Journal
people gathered to protest.1 6 3 That week, a Mainichi Shimbun newspaper
poll indicated that forty-nine percent of Japanese citizens felt sending
troops, even in a non-combat role, would violate the constitution, while
only sixteen percent disagreed and supported the government's posi-
tion.16 4 From the beginning of legislative debate, the bill's supporters
were on the defensive.' 6 5 One government official remarked, "[t]he
heat is much more than we anticipated."' 16 6
Widespread public opposition ultimately killed the Cabinet bill. By
early November, only ten percent of the Japanese people supported the
bill.' 67 Even in the House of Representatives, support for the bill
unravelled. 168 Diet members from Kaifu's LDP party lobbied against
voting on the bill, hoping to avoid the negative political effects of voting
for foreign troop deployment.' 69 On November 8, Kaifu announced he
was dropping the bill without a vote due to its failure to gain support in
the Diet. 170
The question of constitutionality of Japan's sending troops to the
Persian Gulf was not decided by Japan's Supreme Court. Nor was it
decided by the Cabinet, whose interpretation was rejected. The Japa-
nese people, in a strong manifestation of "popular sovereignty,"
decided the question. The people felt that sending SDF troops abroad
was both unconstitutional and undesirable, and they prevented the gov-
ernment from effectuating a change of Article 9.
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. Militarism is still held accountable for the devas-
tation that visited Japan during the Second World War. Japanese citizens have not
forgotten the effects of that war. "I still have horrible memories," said Shotaro Abe,
a banker born in 1942. "My memory is of pain - the pain that hunger creates in
your stomach. My whole family was hungry most of the time in those days. That's
what war did to us. I don't care how this law is written. I'm against it." Michael
Borger, Japan Split Over Sending Troops to Gulf, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Nov. 1,
1990, at A19.
163. Japanese Protest Troops for Gulf, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1990, at A9.
164. Eugene Mousa, Japan Opposition Boycotts Debate on Sending Troops to Gulf,
REUTERS, Oct. 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
165. Public pressure forced Kaifu to announce on October 26 that he had decided
sending troops abroad, even in U.N. police actions, was not constitutional. Weisman,
supra note 154. This effectively reversed the Cabinet position stated 10 days earlier.
See supra note 157 and accompanying text. Kaifu's reversal may have been merely a
return to his original position that led him initially to propose sending only civilians
and SDF personnel on temporary leave. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying
text.
166. Weisman, supra note 154.
167. Japan's New Gulf Contribution Plan Runs into Immediate Trouble, REUTERS, Nov. 9,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
168. By November, 56% of the lower house members opposed the bill. Of the
LDP members in the lower house, fewer than half supported the bill in its Cabinet
draft form. Butts, supra note 143.
169. "Many members of Mr. Kaifu's own party are trying to derail a vote, so they
do not have to go on record as supporting Japan's first overseas military foray in 45
years." David Sanger,Japan's Gulf Commitment Seems Endangered, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1990, at A14.
170. Butts, supra note 21.
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5. Summary of Constitutional Change
In the absence of some kind of constitutional change, such as that which
allowed the creation of the SDF, sending Japanese troops abroad is
inconsistent with Article 9 of Japan's constitution. Legitimate legal
restraints preventJapan's participation in international military sanction
activities. These are not permanent restraints, however, and the Japa-
nese people could remove them either by constitutional amendment or
by the non-textual methods of change described above. 171 But for now,
no such change has occurred, and the constitutional prohibition against
sending troops to foreign lands remains in place and calls into question
Japan's ability to fulfill its U.N. obligations.
M. Requirements of the United Nations Charter
Japan's constitutional restraints forbidding foreign deployment of mili-
tary troops calls into question its ability to fulfill obligations inherent in
U.N. membership. This section will discuss general Charter obligations
as a background to the central issue of U.N. Member military obliga-
tions. This Note argues that Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, especially
Article 43, imposes no legal duty to contribute military forces to U.N.
enforcement activities. This Note will support this conclusion by exam-
ining contributions to the only pre-1990 U.N. enforcement action, the
Korean War. The Korean War precedent appears to establish that non-
military contributions adequately fulfill U.N. membership obligations.
A. Obligations Generally
Upon joining the United Nations, a Member Nation becomes subject to
the terms of the United Nations Charter. Article 4 expressly states that
along with being a "peace-loving state," Members must, as a condition
of membership, "accept the obligations contained in the present Char-
ter," and be "able and willing to carry out these obligations."'172 Of
prime importance to the current discussion are two general obligations.
First, "[aIll Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any
action it takes in accordance with the present Charter;' 73 second,
"[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the deci-
sions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Char-
ter."1 74 With these general obligations in mind, this Note will consider
171. If the Japanese public wanted a military role for Japan in U.N. enforcement
activities, change could be effected without constitutional amendment. For example,
the Cabinet could introduce a bill calling for SDF participation in U.N. military activi-
ties, and if the Diet passed it, the bill would become law. The law would then be
subject to Supreme Court review. If the Supreme Court struck the law down as
unconstitutional, only then would constitutional amendment be necessary to effectu-
ate the change.
172. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1.
173. Id. art. 2, 5 (emphasis added).
174. Id. art. 25 (emphasis added).
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the specific obligation of Member States to contribute armed forces to
U.N. sanction-enforcement activities.
B. U.N. Sanction Enforcement
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, "Action with Respect to Threats to the
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," contains Articles
39 through 51, which outline the Charter's method of enforcing sanc-
tions against forces that disrupt world peace. Chapter VII includes the
obligation to provide military assistance to U.N. activities.
Article 39 empowers the U.N. Security Council 17 5 to make an initial
determination identifying "the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression."' 176 Once a threat is identi-
fied, the Security Council can decide upon and invoke military or non-
military sanctions. 177
Article 41 outlines and discusses non-military sanctions including
severance of economic or diplomatic relations, and restriction of trans-
portation and communication.1 7 8 The Security Council "may call upon
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures." 179 Compli-
ance with non-military sanctions is not conditional;18 0 each Member is
duty-bound, in accordance with Article 25,1 8 1 to comply with the Secur-
ity Council's decision.
If the Security Council feels non-military measures would be or
have been insufficient, it can turn to military means.1 82 Article 42 grants
power to the Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and secur-
ity.' 8 3 Permissible actions include blockades or "other operations by
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations."' 184 Article 43
175. The U.N. Security Council is made up of representatives from 15 nations.
Five nations (the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China) are permanent
Members of the Council; the other 10 non-permanent Members are elected to two-
year terms. Id. art. 23, 1. The Russian Federation assumed the Security Council
seat previously held by the U.S.S.R. on December 24, 1991. End of the Soviet Union:
Soviet U.N. Seat Taken by Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1991, § 1, at 6. Decisions made
by the Security Council must be carried by at least nine votes, "including the concur-
ring votes of the permanent Members." U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 2. Thus each per-
manent Member of the Security Council in effect possesses a veto power over any
Security Council decision.
For a critical discussion of the functioning of the U.N. Security Council during the
war in the Persian Gulf, see John Quigley, The United States and the United Nations in the
Persian Gulf War: New Order or Disorder?, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1992).
176. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
177. Id.
178. Id. art. 4 1.
179. Id.
180. No conditions are attached to the Article 41 requirement to participate in
non-military sanctions once a Member is called upon to do so. Id.
181. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
182. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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governs the contribution of military forces by U.N. Members. Some
commentators refer to Article 43 as containing "the only obligation for a
Member State to participate in any way in the military actions of the
United Nations, and thereby defines a nation's liability insofar as military
action is concerned."1 85
In its first paragraph, Article 43 states:
All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make avail-
able to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, includ-
ing rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security. 18 6
This language explicitly requires all Members to respond to Security
Council calls for armed forces. Under Article 25, each Member must
comply.' 87 "[Sipecial agreement or agreements"' 18 8 govern the method
of compliance. Members are obliged to respond to the Security Council
"on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agree-
ments,"1 8 9 but it is not clear whether the call or the agreement should
occur first. 1 90
For three reasons, the best interpretation is that the agreements
precede the call. '91 First, if a Security Council call were required before
special agreements could be negotiated, a fresh agreement between the
Security Council and each individual Member would be necessary each
time a need arose. Although this approach would be flexible and would
promote agreements tailored to specific enforcement situations, the
practical difficulties of renegotiating agreements with each U.N. Member
for every enforcement action would be administratively cumbersome.
Furthermore, acts of aggression and breaches of the peace typically do
not give advance warning. While new agreements were drafted, the act
or threat would grow unimpeded. Negotiating agreements beforehand,
considering each Member's ability to contribute, and having forces
185. RiKHYE ET AL., supra note 11, at 27 (emphasis added).
186. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 1.
187. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
188. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 1.
189. Id.
190. A "call" refers to an official request by the U.N. Security Council for Member
assistance. A call would most likely be in the form of a Security Council resolution.
The phrase "agreement or agreements" mentioned in Article 43 refers to independ-
ent arrangements negotiated with Members directly by the Security Council. These
agreements would set forth levels of Member contribution to U.N. enforcement activ-
ities. The agreements would have a treaty-like nature, and would be subject to ratifi-
cation in accordance with the constitutional process of each respective Member. Id.
art. 43, 3.
191. HANs KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNrrED NAnONs 748 (4th ed. 1964):
The most plausible interpretation is that first an agreement shall be con-
cluded by which a Member places at the disposal of the Security Council
armed forces, assistance, etc., and then the Council may call upon this Mem-
ber to make available, for an action decided by the Council, the armed forces
agreed upon.
Cornell International Law Journal
already allocated, would provide a more efficient way for the Security
Council to respond. Article 43 calls, made upon allocated troops, would
enable immediate response.
Second, Article 43 mandates that agreements be negotiated as soon
as possible after Charter ratification, without mentioning a specific pur-
pose for which troops under the agreements would be used.19 2 In the
absence of a specific threat, the Charter's drafters apparently expected
agreements to be made prior to anticipated calls for enforcement. If
calls were to precede the agreements, the Charter would not need
explicitly to request agreements unless and until a sanction-enforcement
need arose.
Finally, the Charter's drafters addressed the question whether a
nation could be required to provide more troops than those allocated in
special agreements with the Security Council. The interpretation among
the drafters of Article 43 was that no troops could be required above
and beyond those required by the terms of the special agreements. 193
Nothing outside the agreements binds Members to supply military
troops. Therefore, if no special agreement exists, a Member is not obli-
gated to provide troops in response to a Security Council call.
Consequently, a U.N. Member's obligation to provide armed forces
is conditioned in a way that the obligation to respond non-militarily is
not. Article 41 requires Members to apply non-military sanctions
unconditionally if called upon.' 9 4 By contrast, obligations under Arti-
cle 43 do not mature until the Member has completed special agree-
ments governing military resources. Thus, in the absence of special
agreements, Member States are not under legal obligation to contribute
militarily to Security Council calls for armed forces. The special agree-
ment between a Member and the Security Council acts as a contractual
condition precedent to that Member's troops being called up for U.N.
purposes. This view is generally accepted. 195
Pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 43, the first U.N. Security
192. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 2.
193. LELAND GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONs 280
(2d rev. ed. 1949).
194. Supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
195. KELSEN, supra note 191, at 980-81, n.3 ("As long as these special agreements
are not in force, the obligation of the Members under Article 43 cannot be ful-
filled."); D. W. BowETr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES 277 n.38 (1964) ("All that can be
inferred from Article 43 is that national contingents cannot be compelled to fight on
behalf of the United Nations without Special Agreements being concluded.");
LELAND GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS 161-62 (1959) ("[B]efore Members can be
required to take military measures, they must agree to make available on call and 'in
accordance with a special agreement or agreements... armed forces ... ' "); GOOD-
RICH & HAMBRO, supra note 193, at 280 ("[U]ntil a Member has concluded a special
agreement with the Security Council, it is under no obligation to take military action
under Article 42."); NORMAN BENTWICH & ANDREW MARTIN, COMMENTARY ON THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 97 (1969) ("Pending these agreements... [t]here
is nothing in the Charter to compel the Great Powers to undertake ... action; still
less would any other Member be bound to join in sanctions initiated by them.")
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Council ordered the Military Staff Committee (MSC) 19 6 to develop a
"special agreements" framework for negotiations with Member
states. 19 7 Eager to obtain U.N. forces, the Security Council gave the
MSC less than two months to complete its report. 198 Since representa-
tives on the Military Staff Committee were unable to devise a plan
acceptable to all five permanent Security Council members, the dead-
locked committee failed to produce guidelines for securing agreements
with Member States. 19 9 Consequently, no "special agreements" have
ever been secured.20 0 The U.N. is currently powerless to bind Member
States to respond to calls for armed forces.
Anticipating a brief period of time for the agreement negotiation to
take place, the Charter drafters provided an interim method of collective
security in lieu of special agreements. That method, outlined in Article
106, calls for the five permanent Security Council Members to exercise
Article 42 military duties by consulting with one another, and other
Member States, to take necessary "joint action" pending the activation
of special agreements. 20 1 Due to the unexpected delay in securing spe-
cial agreements, 20 2 Article 106 is the only sanction-enforcement provi-
sion technically in effect. A transitional measure, Article 106 is a not
designed to have long-term effect. In the two military sanction-enforce-
ment situations to date, Korea and the Persian Gulf, the Security Coun-
196. The Military Staff Committee is created by Article 47. U.N CHARTER art. 47,
1. It is made up of the Chiefs of Staff from each of the permanent Members; its duty
is to advise the Security Council on military matters and assist in carrying them out.
Id. art. 47, 2. See also id. art. 47, 1 (outlining duties of the Military Staff
Committee).
197. GOODRIcH, supra note 195, at 164.
198. Id.
199. Id. Most disagreements arose between the former Soviet Union and the other
four permanent Members. For example, the sides differed on such issues as initial
troop contributions by permanent Members (U.S., France, Britain and China favored
flexible ability-based contributions, while the Soviets demanded equal contributions
in terms of troop size and weapon technology); rights of passage and use of bases
(U.S., Britain and China favored such use, the Soviets objected); location of forces
not currently engaged in action (U.S., Britain and China felt these forces, according
to the special agreements, should be based wherever Member States wanted them,
while the Soviets wanted such troops back within the borders of the contributing
Member State); and withdrawal of forces after conflict resolution (U.S., Britain,
France and China favored Security Council governed withdrawal, and the Soviets
demanded immediate withdrawal). LELAND GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE
UNrrED NATONS 321-22 (3d rev. ed. 1969). The distrust generated by the Cold War
is mainly to blame for these failures. As the Soviet representative noted, the major
differences were political, not technical. Id. at 323.
200. For a discussion of other problems caused by the failure to conclude special
agreements, see generally William Gehrke, Note, The Mozambique Crisis: A Case for
United Nations Military Intervention, 24 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 135, 151-52 (1991).
201. U.N. CHARTER art. 106.
202. The Security Council must take the blame for this delay in finalizing special
agreements. Article 43 states that these agreements are to be made "on the initiative
of the Security Council." Id. art. 43, 3. In light of the Security Council's failure to
provide the framework into which troops would be committed, it is not surprising
that Member States have not taken the initiative by volunteering troops for general
Article 43 purposes. Nor is it their legal duty to do so.
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cil did not rely on Article 106 as the basis for U.N. actions, but drew
authority from Chapter VII. 20 In response to Chapter VII calls for sup-
port, Member States have contributed troops voluntarily-not in
response to any Article 43 duty.2 0 4
C. The Korean Example
Until the Persian Gulf War, the Korean War was the only concerted mili-
tary enforcement action taken by a united Security Council under Chap-
ter VII.2 0 5 Concerted action was made possible when the Soviet
representative walked out on the Council in January 1950 to protest the
seating of the Kuomintang Chinese representative as president in rota-
tion.20 6 Without the threat of a Soviet veto, the Council passed three
resolutions, one calling for military sanctions against North Korea. 20 7
The Soviets soon realized their error and returned on August 1, 1950 to
prevent further Security Council action.20 8 Because special agreements
had not been made under Article 43, the Council could not invoke the
legal duty to contribute troops.20 9 Rather, the Council "recom-
mend[ed]" that Member States "furnish such assistance to the Republic
of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack .... ,,210 The
response to this call was voluntary. 2 11
Not all assistance was military. Two days after passing the resolu-
tion asking for assistance, the Security Council sent resolution copies to
Member States asking what support they could give.21 2 According to
one commentator, "[t]he replies ranged from specific support of the
Resolution and offers of armed forces or other assistance (foodstuffs, medical
supplies, air and sea transport, finance, etc.) to general support but with no
firm offer of assistance." 2 13 Thus, in the Korean War, Member States
203. The U.N. Security Council Resolutions regarding Korea did not explicitly
state their Charter authority, but simply recommended that Members assist Korea.
This language reflects the provision in Article 39 wherein the Security Council is to
make recommendations upon determining a breach of the peace. Id. art. 39. The
authority to make a recommendation probably can be derived from Chapter VII,
Article 39. See Bow~rr, supra note 195, at 32.
The Security Council Resolutions on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait explicitly base their
authority on Chapter VII. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th session, 2933d
mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/661 (1990); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th session, 2963d
mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/678 (1990).
204. Rnonr, ET A.., supra note 11, at 25.
205. Id. at 4.
206. Id. at 28-29. The Soviets did not recognize the Kuomintang Chinese as the
rightful owners of China's Security Council seat, but believed that it belonged to the
Communist Chinese government on mainland China.
207. Bowzrr, supra note 195, at 30-31.
208. FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE LAw OF PEACE AND WAR 34
(1966).
209. Id. at 32.
210. S. C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th session, 474th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/83
(1950).
211. SEYERSTED, supra note 208, at 33.
212. BowErr, supra note 195, at 36-37.
213. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
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were requested to supply military troops. Some volunteered troops; 2 14
others responded with nonmilitary support. 2 15 Because special agree-
ments had not been previously completed, nations not providing troops
did not violate their Charter obligations. In the absence of special
agreements, the same situation exists today.
IV. Does Japan Deserve U.N. Membership?
Article 43 is the only Article in the U.N. Charter calling for military con-
tributions to sanction-enforcement endeavors. 2 16 The legal duty to pro-
vide troops is contingent upon special agreements to be negotiated
between the Security Council and each Member State, at the Security
Council's initiative. 2 17 No such agreement has been concluded with
Japan, or with any Member State. 2 18 In the absence of such agreements,
Japan does not have a legal duty to provide troops to U.N. sanction-
enforcement activities.
In the Korean conflict, many nations provided support other than
by sending troops. 2 19 Similarly, Japan was legally justified in sending
financial or other non-personnel resources to the Gulf. Bowett charac-
terized pre-agreement contribution to U.N. military forces as "a moral
rather than legal obligation." 220 IfJapan must choose between a consti-
tutional restraint and a moral obligation, the constitutional restraint
must prevail. Moreover, Japan can satisfy the moral obligation in non-
military ways.
The question still remains, however, whetherJapan, constitutionally
prevented from sending troops to U.N. enforcement missions, is fit for
membership in the United Nations. Article 4 of the U.N. Charter states
that being able and willing to carry out Charter obligations is a condi-
214. The 17 states contributing troops included the U.S., Britain, Australia, Can-
ada, France, Bolivia, Thailand, Turkey, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Philip-
pines. Offers of Military Assistance to the United Commandfor Korea (As of 17 October 1952),
1952 U.N.Y.B. 214-15, U.N. Sales No. 1953.1.30. U.S. and Korean troops, however,
made up 90.42% of ground troops, 93.34% of naval forces, and 99.03% of air forces.
BowETr, supra note 195, at 40.
215. For example, Brazil offered $2.7 million; Uruguay donated $2 million and
70,000 blankets; Peru, $65,000; Lebanon, $50,000; Pakistan, 5,000 tons of wheat;
and Iceland, 125 tons of cod liver oil. None of these countries donated military
troops or equipment. For donations to Korea for 1950, see Assistance Offered to the
Republic of Korea During 1950, 1950 U.N.Y.B. 226-28, U.N. Sales No. 1951.1.24. An
updated donations list is in Summaries of Military and Relief Assistance for Korea (As of 15
January 1952), 1951 U.N.Y.B. 249, U.N. Sales No. 1952.1.30. Military donations up
to October 17, 1952, are found in Offers of Military Assistance to the United Command for
Korea (As of 17 October 1953), 1952 U.N.Y.B. 214-15, U.N. Sales No. 1953.1.30. The
above countries do not appear on this military list.
216. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
217. U.N. CHARmR art. 43; see supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
220. BowETr, supra note 195, at 561.
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tion to membership. 22 ' While the Security Council has never sought
Article 43 agreements, might Japan be unworthy of U.N. membership if
it did? According to Hans Kelsen:
The special agreements referred to in Article 43 do not refer to the
question as to whether or not the Member shall provide armed forces and
especially national air-force contingents; they refer only to the question
how these obligations established by the Charter itself shall be fulfilled on
the part of the Member.2 22
This view suggests that if the Security Council pursued agreements,
non-military contribution would not satisfy Article 43 requirements.
The agreements only decide the type and quantity of military aid and
not whether it will be forthcoming at all.
Mandatory military contribution is supported by the Military Staff
Committee (MSC) interpretation of Article 43. During its unsuccessful
meetings to establish guidelines for Security Council agreements with
Member States,2 23 the MSC developed forty-one Articles. Only twenty-
five of these were unanimously accepted, as differences could not be
resolved on the others. 224 Even though the unanimously accepted Arti-
cles do not have legal weight, they show how the MSC envisioned agree-
ments to occur. MSC Article 9 was accepted as follows: "All Member
Nations shall have the opportunity as well as the obligation to place armed
forces, facilities and other assistance at the disposal of the Security
Council on its call and in accordance with their capabilities and the require-
ments of the Security Council. ' 22 5
A literal reading of MSC Article 9 and Kelsen's commentary sug-
gests that if and when agreement negotiations take place, purely non-
military proposals would be insufficient because Article 43 obliges Mem-
ber States to provide armed forces. If all nations must provide military
troops when the Security Council concludes Article 43 agreements,
Japan would be unable to fulfill that obligation. Japan would conse-
quently be unable to carry out Charter obligations as required by Article
4,226 and therefore possibly unworthy of U.N. membership.
The argument that Article 43 agreements must include military
donations fails for three reasons. First, some Member States, Iceland
for example, have no military. Although these Members would never be
221. U.N. CHARTER art. 4, 1: "Membership in the United Nations is open to all
other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and
which, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obliga-
tions." (emphasis added).
222. KELSEN, supra note 191, at 750.
223. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
224. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 193, at 282.
225. Report by Military Staff Committee on the General Principles Governing the Organization
of the Armed Forces Made Available to the Security Council by Member Nations of the United
Nations, art. 9, U.N. DOC. S/336 (1947), reprinted in Louis B. SOHN, BASIc Docu-
MENTS OF THE UNrrED NATiONS 86 (1956) [hereinafter Military Staff Report] (emphasis
added).
226. See supra note 221.
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able to comply with a request for troops, they retain membership status.
Indeed, it would seem ironic to force a nation to militarize in order to
retain membership in an organization formed to "save succeeding gen-
erations from the scourge of war." 22 7
Second, the U.N. Military Staff Committee, as expressed in MSC
Article 14, was sensitive to this ability-to-contribute issue:
. Contributions by Member Nations of the United Nations, other than
the Permanent Members of the Security Council, may not necessarily be repre-
sented by armed forces. Such other Member Nations which may be unable to
furnish armed forces may fulfill their obligation to the United Nations by
furnishing facilities and other assistance in accordance with agreements
reached with the Security Council. 22 8
Again, this Article is not legally binding, but it illustrates the unanimous
MSC position that contributions other than armed forces would satisfy
Article 43 obligations.
Third, U.N. Charter Article 48 grants the Security Council discre-
tion in determining which Members will participate in any particular
enforcement activity. 229 This provision probably envisions regional
participation in local conflicts, but other factors could influence Security
Council decisions, including the constitutional restraints of Member
States. If the Security Council may exemptJapan from contributing mil-
itarily to any one enforcement mission, it has power to exempt Japan
from all enforcement missions. Any Article 43 agreement could explic-
itly include a general Article 48 exemption stating the reasons therefore.
Japan could then agree to contribute in other areas to compensate for
the lack of military support.
To be consistent, the MSC Article 9 imposition of an "obligation to
place armed forces, facilities, and other assistance at the disposal of the
Security Council" 28 0 must be viewed in light of MSC Article 14. The
Article 9 obligation to provide "armed forces, facilities and other assist-
ance" is not meant to bind each Member to all three forms of contribu-
tions. Rather, each Member must provide one, two, or all three of the
items listed, according to ability. Kelsen's statement2 31 can similarly be
read, expressing simply that the agreement negotiations would not dis-
cuss whether states would contribute troops and other assistance, but
rather would examine what combination and quantity of those items a
Member would contribute.
Article 43 also makes the negotiated special agreements contingent
upon ratification by the Member State's constitutional procedures. 23 2
227. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
228. Militay Staff Report, supra note 225, at 87 (emphasis added).
229. U.N. CHARTER art. 48, 1.
230. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
232. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 3.
The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on
the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the
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Since the agreements can be invalidated by legislatures, the Charter
appears to defer to Member States' procedural law. And though Article
103 makes U.N. Charter obligations supreme over other international
treaties, 233 Article 43 makes the Charter pay deference to the proce-
dural constitutional law of each Member.23 4 The Charter is silent as to
substantive constitutional law, but it seems unlikely that the Charter
would require a Member to violate its own constitution to fulfill Charter
obligations.
In summary, the U.N. Charter does not require military donations
from Member States; such donations are purely voluntary. 2 35 Members
have the moral obligation to contribute to sanction-enforcement activi-
ties2 36 and must fully comply with economic embargoes. 23 7 Military
contributions, however, are not legally required until a Member ratifies
a special agreement with the Security Council.238 Moreover, the ability
to supply military troops is not a prerequisite to Article 43 agree-
ments. 23 9 Members, like Japan, who cannot send troops abroad, can
contribute to Article 43 sanction enforcement by donating "assistance
and facilities" 240 and thereby demonstrate that they are "willing and
able" 241 to carry out their Charter obligations.
Conclusion
Japan's constitution limits military participation in U.N. enforcement
activities. Japan has satisfied U.N. responsibilities in this area with non-
military contributions. In the Persian Gulf War, Japan was unable to
respond to international pressure for troops, but participated in the eco-
nomic embargo and pledged thirteen billion dollars in non-military con-
tributions.24 2 Japan's financial contribution had a much greater impact
than a token 2,000 person force envisioned by the failed U.N. toopera-
tion Bill.
During the Persian Gulf War, Japan's leaders had three choices:
1. To recognize the constitutional prohibition against sending troops
abroad imposed by Article 9 and to refuse to participate militarily in the
Gulf.
Security Council and Member States or between the Security Council and
groups of Member States and shall be subject to ratification by the signatoy states in
accordance with their constitutional processes.
Id. (emphasis added).
233. Id. art. 103.
234. See supra note 232.
235. See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
240. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 1.
241. Id. art. 4, 1.
242. See supra note 1.
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2. To make sending troops abroad for U.N. purposes legal by enacting a
constitutional amendment.
3. To make sending troops abroad for U.N. purposes legal by extra-con-
stitutional means; that is, by amending the SDF law or enacting a new
deployment authorization law.
In the future, when similar situations arise, Japan will have the same
three choices. Depending on the circumstances, the people of Japan
may then allow military troops to be sent abroad. Only when the Japa-
nese are willing to take that step will constitutional change, either by
amendment, or by informal means, be possible.2 43 One of MacArthur's
goals during the occupation was to install a strong democratic system,
unlike anything the Japanese had ever experienced. It is now because of
that strong democracy that the ideals in Article 9 are preserved.
In the meantime, the government of Japan should respond quickly
and generously to future U.N. calls for assistance with non-military
resources and should take a firm, principled stand behind its constitu-
tion. Other nations, and certainly the U.N., should understand Japan's
position and resist pressuring change. Since the adoption of the "Peace
Constitution," the Japanese have viewed it as an ideal for the rest of the
world to follow. If all nations had constitutions like Japan's and lived by
them, the U.N.'s job of peacekeeping would be much easier. Having
learned about the scourges of war by experiencing them first hand in the
1940s, Japan is now determined never to repeat those horrors. While
Japan's refusal to contribute militarily to U.N. sanction-enforcement
actions may look like a free ride, the world may one day regret pressur-
ing an economic superpower to be more militaristic. 24 4
Robert B. Funk
243. After the end of the Persian Gulf War, the LDP set up a Special Research
Council for International Contribution, chaired by former party general secretary
Ichiro Ozawa. The committee was designed to consider the legal relationship
between Japan's constitution and the U.N. Charter, and to discuss methods of con-
tributing in some fashion to future U.N. peacekeeping operations. Hara Oishi, Troop
Role on Agenda of LDP Panel; Ozawa to Head New Research Council on Japan's World Role,
NIKKEI WEEKLY, June 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. Addi-
tionally, in December 1991, the Diet failed to pass another U.N. peacekeeping-
related bill, this one sponsored by new Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa. The bill,
authorizing foreign deployment of SDF troops for emergency relief missions and
non-combat U.N. peacekeeping activities, was passed by the lower house despite a
brawl that broke out during deliberations. Sam Jameson, Japan's Lower House Oks
Sending Military Overseas, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1991, at Al; Michael Nol, Opposition Par-
ties Stall Peacekeeping Bill, UPI, Nov. 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
File. The bill stalled in the upper house, which deferred consideration to the next
ordinary Diet session. KYODO NEws SERVICE, Dec. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File. Prime Minister Miyazawa has vowed to continue to fight for pas-
sage of such a bill. Id.
244. As this issue went to press, the Japanese Parliament approved a bill authoriz-
ing Japanese military personnel to participate to a limited extent in international
peacekeeping operations. See David E. Sanger,Japans Parliament Votes to End Ban on
Sending Troops Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1992, at Al; David E. Sanger, Japan's
Troops May Sail, and the Fear is Mutual, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992, § 4, at 4.

